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ABSTRACT
This paper stems from a theoretical reflection on the concepts of multiculturalism, transculturality and national 
identity within the perspective of studies of nationalism, situating a particular case study (Slovenia) within a broader 
academic debate about the construction of national identities in the contemporary world marked by processes of 
transnationalism, globalisation and regionalisation. Even though humanity has always been a patchwork of multicul-
tural, multilingual and multiethnic co-existence, national states remain secluded in ideals of monocultural national 
identities, constructing national myths and histories in order to demarcate separate symbolic national member-
ships. This article contends that both the top-down and bottom-up activities of so-called national elites work on 
constructing and elevating one selected national culture and history, taking allegedly “ethnic bonds” as a starting 
point for creating nation-ness that is supposedly unique and separate. This is particularly pronounced in multiethnic 
environments within similar cultural frameworks, where differences between nations need to be accentuated and 
constructed as fundamentally diverse. Drawing on the example of Slovenian ethno-national identity construction, 
the article argues that national myths play a pivotal role in creating difference and promoting national uniqueness.
Key words: nationalism, national identity, national elites, national myths, ethnogenesis, Slovenia, Caranthania, the 
Venetic theory
I MITI DELL’IDENTITÀ NAZIONALE:
GLI SLOVENI, LA CARANTANIA E LA TEORIA VENETA
SINTESI
Il presente articolo nasce da una riflessione teorica sui concetti di multiculturalismo, transculturalità e identità 
nazionale nella prospettiva degli studi di nazionalismo, e colloca un particolare studio analitico (Slovenia) in un più 
ampio dibattito accademico sulla costruzione delle identità nazionali nel mondo contemporaneo, segnato da pro-
cessi di transnazionalismo, globalizzazione e regionalizzazione. Anche se l’umanità è sempre stata un mosaico di 
coesistenza multiculturale, multilingue e multietnica, gli stati nazionali rimangono isolati negli ideali delle identità na-
zionali monoculturali, costruendo miti e storie nazionali al fine di delimitare delle simboliche e distinte appartenenze 
nazionali. L’articolo sostiene che sia con le attività dall’alto sia con quelle dal basso le cosiddette élites nazionali 
s’impegnano a costruire ed elevare una cultura e storia nazionale selezionata, prendendo dei presunti “legami etnici” 
come punto di partenza per creare un’identità nazionale che si suppone unica e distinta. Questo è particolarmente 
marcato in ambienti multietnici all’interno di simili contesti culturali, dove le differenze tra le nazioni devono essere 
accentuate e quest’ultime costruite come fondamentalmente diverse. Attingendo all’esempio della costruzione di 
un’identità slovena etno-nazionale, l’articolo sostiene che i miti nazionali svolgano un ruolo fondamentale nella cre-
azione delle differenze e nella promozione dell’unicità nazionale.
Parole chiave: nazionalismo, identità nazionale, élites nazionali, miti nazionali, etnogenesi, Slovenia, Carantania, 
teoria veneta
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the dramatic improvements in infrastruc-
ture and technology for transportation and communi-
cation, particularly after the Second World War, social 
sciences have been ripe with analyses of how these pro-
cesses affect people’s interaction, change social values 
and demarcations of the familiar. Becoming a catch-
word at the end of the 20th century, “globalisation” was 
adopted as a concept to explain the new modalities of 
living, where more people can travel faster and to more 
distant parts of the world. New technologies and digital 
media such as the Internet, satellite broadcasts, and mo-
bile phones not only enable interpersonal communica-
tion and a connected presence but also bring together a 
previously unthinkable “global audience” for simultane-
ously performed global events. Does all this, however, 
mean that the intensity of cross-cultural exchange and 
the blurring of ethnic, national, religious, racial, gender, 
sexual and other differences diminishes the power of 
community (i.e. in-group) affiliations? 
Addressing a gap in existing research, this paper 
stems from a theoretical reflection on the studies of na-
tionalism and attempts to explain the unabated appeal 
of national affiliations by associating a particular case 
study (Slovenia) with a broader academic debate about 
the construction and promulgation of national identities 
in the contemporary world that is marked by processes 
of transnationalism, globalisation and regionalisation. 
Rather than being surprised at the continuous power 
of ethnic, national, racial or religious identifications (as 
well as prejudice, animosity and conflict, cf. Sedmak, 
2010), this article attempts to explain the persistence 
of nationalism and national identity by pointing to their 
roles as emotional anchors in the contemporary world 
of increased globalising influences. Put differently, theo-
retical attempts to diminish negative perceptions of the 
Other, such as the so-called intergroup contact theory 
(Pettigrew, 1998), fall short of explaining why national 
states, as well as ethno-national attachments, continue 
to hold sway over people’s feelings of belonging and loy-
alty.1 As one of the key theories in the social sciences for 
improving intergroup relations, the intergroup contact 
theory rightly claims that intergroup contact helps to im-
prove attitudes toward different types of often stigmatised 
groups, such as racial, national and ethnic minorities, 
homosexuals, the homeless, and people with disabilities 
(Pettigrew, Tropp, 2011). My argument is complementary 
to the hypothesis of intergroup contact, yet instead of en-
gaging in the debate on how increased intergroup con-
tact promotes a cessation of previously existing animosi-
ties, it is of relevance for this article that the existence of 
similarities between groups which claim to be different 
actually harbours the potential for tensions. Creating dif-
ference hence becomes of pivotal importance, particu-
larly in cases where groups are close (e.g. not separated 
by distinct languages), because the assimilation of one 
group by the other is feasible (Schöpflin, 2000).
And while ethnicity, like any social identity, is always 
a product of contact, not isolation, the boundary-creat-
ing effects of national myths are examined here as piv-
otal to both historic nation-building processes, as well as 
contemporary nationalisms. This paper demonstrates this 
point by reviewing the myth-making tenets of classical 
nation-building and by analysing selected examples of 
recent attempts at retrospective nationalism. By project-
ing mythical accounts of ethnogenesis, national identity 
becomes grounded in the primordial confines of blood 
and belonging, rather than in a civic elective member-
ship in a community of multiethnic and multicultural 
solidarity. Although ethnicity is an aspect of relationship, 
not a cultural property of a group (Eriksen, 1993; cf. Kol-
stø, 2005), both the top-down and bottom-up activities 
of so-called national elites work on elevating one se-
lected “national culture”, using allegedly ethno-cultural 
components for creating nation-ness which is suppos-
edly unique and separate. These processes are particu-
larly pronounced in multiethnic environments within 
similar cultural frameworks, where differences between 
nations need to be accentuated and constructed as fun-
damentally diverse. The nationalisation of public sphere, 
institutions and collective memories is a classic trait of 
all national states, which may adopt banal nationalising 
practices (e.g. Billig, 1995) or more virulent construc-
tions of nationhood (e.g. Kolstø, 2009).2 Even though 
humanity has always been a patchwork of multicultural, 
multilingual and multiethnic co-existence, national states 
remain secluded in ideals of monocultural national iden-
tities, constructing national myths and histories in order 
to demarcate separate symbolic national memberships.
A specific Slovenian national consciousness preceded 
the formation of the national state, and due to a historic 
lack of statehood, nobility, military, economic or politi-
cal elites, it was the formalisation of a distinctive literary 
1 I am fully aware of oversimplifying both processes of globalisation one the one hand and social identity formation (e.g. national attach-
ment) on the other. This simplification is purposeful, since dealing with the complexity of globalisation merely in its cultural implications 
would surpass the scope of this article, let alone addressing the phenomenon’s economic, social and political dimensions as well. In the 
same vein, it is not my aim to engage in the traditional debates surrounding the formation of nations and nationalism, but rather to point 
at the necessity of contextualising contemporary nationalising practices in both historical trajectories of nationalism as well as in current 
transnational realities.
2 Nationalisation represents ethnicised ideas of separate nationhood. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate more on pro-
cesses of nation-building and homogenising actions of national states, allow me to simply note that nationalising practices pertain both 
to historic trajectories of national movements as discussed in classical accounts of nationalism, as well as to processes of contemporary 
ethnicisation of national states, as exemplified by current European states’ migration, integration, citizenship and naturalisation policies.
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language that helped elevate a separate Slovenian na-
tional identity in the 19th century. While the construction 
and reproduction of Slovenian national identity needs to 
be understood with regard to its connection with certain 
specific pre-existing cultural and linguistic patterns, ex-
plorations of nationalism have yet to offer an analysis 
of the role of mythology for Slovenian nationhood. It is 
widely established that “ethnic components” have been 
of vital importance for the nation and its survival. Moreo-
ver, regardless of their actual presence in the national 
past, or their created “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm, 
Ranger, 1983) with little or no historical relevance, the 
Slovenians believe that they share certain characteristics 
that make them Slovenians and tend to see these national 
traits as stretching far back into history.
This paper re-examines the position of national elites, 
seeing their role in the processes of nationalism as not 
only related to the early stages of nation-building and 
providing the impetus for the national movements of the 
18th and 19th century, but also as essential in terms of 
the vitality of contemporary nationalist ideas and prac-
tices. Using the example of attempts at linking Slovenian 
nationhood to ancient origins of pre-modern statehood 
(e.g. Caranthania), the cyclical re-emergence of nation-
alist myths, particularly those addressing the question of 
ethnogenesis, is argued as having served as a mobilising 
force for establishing national uniqueness and legitimis-
ing the nation’s existence.3 This is frequently juxtaposed 
by populist political claims to redress historical injus-
tices or divert public attention from an impending crisis. 
This paper therefore offers a sociological account of the 
importance of historical continuity for the idea of the na-
tion, arguing that national myths and histories are con-
structed with the aim of demarcating separate symbolic 
national memberships. 
ELITES AND THE CREATION OF NATION-NESS
The cultural shreds and patches used by national-
ism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old 
shred and patch would have served as well (Gellner, 
1983, 56).
We should not be misled by a curious, but under-
standable, paradox: modern nations and all their 
impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of 
novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and 
the opposite of constructed, namely human commu-
nities so “natural” as to require no definition other 
than self-assertion. (Hobsbawm, 1983, 14)
An array of mainstream research on nationalism has 
identified political elites and intellectuals as those who 
most commonly initiate national demands, thus repre-
senting the key figures in building national identity and 
forming national myths and rituals. The role of national 
elites is therefore central to many analyses of national-
ism (e.g. Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983; Hroch, 2000). This 
specific group of people, whose attributes make them 
politically or administratively more powerful than the 
everyman, is singled out due to their specific social po-
sition. They may be powerful because of their ascribed 
title, status or possessions, but often these are well-
educated people who do not necessarily occupy any 
specific positions of prestige or power. John Hutchinson 
(1987) distinguishes between humanist intellectuals and 
secular intelligentsia, yet despite a divergence in their 
interests refers to both as “ethnic revivalists”. 
Historically, it was often the dominant power elites 
who “invited masses into history” (Nairn, 1981), chang-
ing themselves only insofar as their new “image” ap-
pealed to the broader community of the nation, with 
which they suddenly came to identify and whose inter-
ests they claimed to be representing. From transforming 
peasants into Frenchmen (Weber, 1976) to “We have 
made Italy, now we must make Italians”4, examples of 
such top-down state-to-nation historical formations are 
numerous. Yet the motives behind national “awaken-
ing” and agitation are different. Some authors argue that 
peripheral elites feel deprived and cut off from power 
centres, thus forming their own separatist nationalisms 
in order to break loose from suppressing bonds, conse-
quently establishing their own sovereign political entity. 
Gellner’s Ruritanians (1983), Nairn’s peripheral elites 
(1981), and Anderson’s Creole pioneers (1991) are cases 
in point. Acknowledging that elites are always associ-
ated with and play a pivotal role in determining the ex-
pression of nationalism, elite nationalism is, however, 
not in itself enough for popular nationalism (Whitmeyer, 
2002, 324). Supported by empirical evidence where 
popular nationalism did not develop in spite of elite in-
volvement, Whitmeyer’s argument is that elites create 
the means for nationalistic expression and take advan-
tage of it, yet are not the direct creators of nationalism. 
In other words, although the role of the elite and edu-
cated classes in national movements is undoubtedly im-
portant, the modernists’ emphasis on the role of political 
elites and institutions should always be complemented 
by a bottom-up approach that takes into account the 
non-elite strata of the population. Montserrat Guibernau 
hence talks about “potential intelligentsia” and defines 
them as “those educated individuals who, if the nation-
alist movement succeeds, are likely to become its lead-
ers” (Guibernau, 1999, 91).
The beginning of every national movement depends 
on the passion of a group of people (Hroch, 2000); 
3 These attempts, though quite marginal on the overall, have nonetheless proved to be resilient and thus mark not only the two decades of 
Slovenian independent statehood but also entail a longer trajectory.
4 Allegedly the statement of Massimo d’Azeglio after the unification of Italy.
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whether these are political elites of de-colonising 
“third world” nationalisms, or intellectuals who cease-
lessly work on “discovering” the national past, their 
aim is the same: they provide the ground on which na-
tionalisms can stand and are thus perceived in national 
histories as national “awakeners”. The past, namely, is 
a “powerful source of legitimacy for those who would 
change the present for a new future” (McCrone, 1998, 
52). It is also significant how particular elites shape 
the expression of nationalism, taking into account that 
at least to some degree they conflate “national goals” 
with their own needs. The actual circumstances and 
the level of elite involvement with politics depend on 
specific factors, yet what matters most is the fact that 
behind every nationalism or national movement real 
people act as purveyors of national identity, promoting 
the elevation of the nation and employing political ac-
tion for its success. But for nationalism to be successful 
it needs to be supported by different social classes; it 
needs the illusion of the homogeneity of the nation and 
mass public support. In so-called established nations, 
of course, this public support ebbs and flows, yet na-
tional affiliations remain quite firmly grounded. In or-
der for this to be possible, the reality of the nation plays 
a key role. Though representing only a small portion of 
the population, without the “national vision” of these 
nation-builders nations would lack the appearance 
of the realness so significant for emotional identifica-
tion, and people could not be mobilised for “national 
goals”, at least not as readily.
The role of elites in the processes of historic nation-
formation has been accentuated especially in the mod-
ernist theories of nationalism, where the enlightened 
intelligentsia are recognised as being the first to lead 
the way into the new world where religious authorities 
had lost their influence (cf. Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 
1983; Anderson, 1991). Due to changes in the politi-
cal organisation of social life and the consequent emer-
gence of the modern national state, their function was 
to construct national identities. Sometimes, these were 
already present in the form of solid ethnic identities and 
just needed some re-appropriation. Oftentimes though, 
considerable “re-inventing” was necessary. It has thus 
been the task of the educated classes to explore the spe-
cific history of their nation and provide “maps” of their 
community (McCrone, 1998, 53). Nineteenth-century 
Europe’s interest in peasant traditions, folklore and cus-
toms serves as an example of the diligence which schol-
ars exhibited in this regard. “Pre-historic” myths, sym-
bols, customs and folklore were the basis on which new 
national cultures were built. Whether these “descent 
myths” were the creation of political elites who en-
larged their circle of interest to broader masses because 
they needed people’s support, or the consequence of 
the romanticist nineteenth-century search for one’s na-
tional past, it served the homogenisation and unification 
that the modern national states needed; putting the one 
selected core nation on a pedestal and, if not already 
granted, demanding political independence.
What the classical theories of nationalism leave 
out, however, is the contemporary continuation of the 
nationalist construction of difference. Rather than lim-
iting the theoretical gaze to nation-building processes 
that are habitually analysed as a matter of the past, they 
need to be studied as constantly evolving. In the present, 
national states have far from stopped investing in the 
myth-making nationalist constructions of separate na-
tional histories. And as pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm 
(1983), what becomes a national tradition is oftentimes 
partially or even wholly invented, yet always meaning-
fully constructed in order to enhance national identity 
and the feeling of togetherness.
THE ETHNICISATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
The role of invention and construction in every na-
tion is both clearly evident and, indeed, necessary. Nev-
ertheless, national elites would face a much harder task 
in inculcating national identities were they not to draw 
on some sort of pre-existing regional, cultural, religious 
or other affiliations. Moreover, traditions are not simply 
inherited, “they have to be reproduced” (Calhoun, 1997, 
50). This is why national states invest in educational sys-
tems, public symbols and the organised perpetuation of 
nationhood; and this is why nationalism is much more 
than just a political principle that supposedly ceases to 
exist once national states are created. The complex na-
ture of nationalism lies in its exceptional ability to adapt 
to different socio-political and historical circumstances. 
It is because nationalisms use the idea of the nation as 
a community, and of national identity as its most char-
acteristic trait, that they are so powerful. Whether they 
accentuate the more pluralist civic or the purely eth-
nic elements of identification, nationalisms’ true power 
lies as much in their banal invisibility as it does in their 
chauvinist forms.
It is particularly significant that new and fragile states 
are anxious to establish themselves as legitimate national 
communities, and problems have been known to arise 
when a national state lacks the appearance of being 
based on only one ethnicity. In such cases, uniting the 
nation under a sole myth of descent might represent quite 
a hindrance. One of the most important elements of every 
successful nationalism is its primary belief in the distinc-
tiveness of its nation. A bond needs to be shared and for 
many nations this bond has been the language. Legiti-
mised with the national movement of the late 18th century, 
when Sprachgeschichte came to be understood as Volks-
geschichte (Štih, 2005, 232), the Slovenian case shows 
that evocations of a “golden age” or collective memories 
of an ancient homeland have been much less prominent. 
The symbolic “homeland”, or what would nowadays be 
termed Slovenian ethnic territory, has always been great-
er than the area of the present Slovenian state, as is the 
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case with most nations. It is also a fact that borderland 
areas have always experienced considerable permeation 
of different cultures and languages, thus making clear-cut 
linguistic identifications hard to establish. One such ex-
ample would be the similarities between dialects along 
borders between states; a kind of “dialect continuum” 
making them much closer to each other despite the fact 
that their states’ codified languages are quite distinct. A 
continuum of dialects exists “where those people whose 
villages are physically close to each other have learned 
to understand each other” (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000, 9). 
Moreover, the notion of different dialects is essential if 
the states are to maintain the idea of separate languages 
(Billig, 1995), therefore, the contemporary Slovenians 
speak the “Slovenian language”, including dialects that 
are close to languages of the contiguous states.
In 1991, Slovenia wasted no time in attempting to 
differentiate itself from its predecessor, Yugoslavia, for 
with independence came the need to change its pub-
lic symbols and establish itself as a sovereign state. The 
Slovenian national identity has been renegotiated in the 
light of changes connected to the collapse of communist 
ideology, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the establish-
ment of an independent Slovenian state. Post-1991 re-
writing of history textbooks, the change of state symbols 
and the renaming of public places provide an illustration 
of the change in national memory (Bajt, 2009), yet these 
official alterations have also reflected a recent populari-
sation of an ethnicised national mythology.
Moreover, Slovenia was established as a state of 
and for (cf. Brubaker, 1999) the Slovenian nation with-
out much difficulty. Or, to be more precise, and this is 
crucial, without difficulty for those residents who were 
considered ethnic Slovenians. Namely, the formation 
of Slovenia as a national state of the Slovenian nation 
resulted in a massive violation of human rights against 
over 25,000 permanent residents who were not auto-
matically accepted as a part of the new national com-
munity. Kept under wraps and out of public debate until 
2002, the plight of inhabitants from the former Yugosla-
via who were excluded from Slovenian citizenship and, 
more importantly, who were removed from the register 
of permanent residents of Slovenia, became known as 
“the erasure”.5 The erasure is paramount to understand-
ing the policies that should address Slovenia’s multieth-
nic reality (e.g. policies on integration and migration, 
minorities, naturalisation), yet remain secluded to the 
ethnicised framework of preferential treatment of the 
“core” nation.6 The very functioning of the Slovenian 
state institutions, policies, even public opinion confirms 
the complex interdependence between the core na-
tion and disprivileged minorities, which are excluded 
through the nationalist and racist logic of non-belong-
ing. Regardless of dry legalistic official proclamations, 
Slovenian citizenship has been defined in terms of 
ethnicity (as ius sanguinis). Rather than taking into ac-
count the territorial principle, which would imply that 
permanent residents would have automatically become 
Slovenian citizens rather than erased residents, the logic 
underlying the exclusion of the erased people is also 
manifested in the exclusionary attitudes that Slovenia as 
a national state and the Slovenians as its majority na-
tion may adopt towards the Roma, Muslims, immigrants, 
and various other marginalised minorities. That Slove-
nia was conceived as the state of and for the Slovenian 
nation is confirmed, among other, by the Constitution, 
where the establishment of the state is explained with 
“the fundamental and permanent right of the Slovene 
nation to self-determination; and from the historical fact 
that in a centuries-long struggle for national liberation 
we Slovenes have established our national identity and 
asserted our statehood”.7
ETHNOGENESIS AND MYTH-MAKING IN 
RETROSPECTIVE NATIONALISM
Nationhood is not something one is born with, de-
spite commonsensical beliefs in the perennial and pri-
mordial roots of ethnicity, but rather a cognitive process 
of recognition through socialisation. It is, therefore, es-
sential for the establishment of coherence that the fac-
tors, which lead to members of two groups seeing each 
other as different rather than as members of a unifying 
collective, are frequently “mythical” rather than “factu-
al” (Kolstø, 2005, 3). Ethnogenesis should thus be seen 
as an evolving process of constant transformation (Štih, 
2005), reflecting particular socio-political circumstanc-
es of any given historical moment when they may be 
called upon to serve the reification and establishment of 
a national community.
Nations have to determine the basis of their being, 
and national myths, as sets of beliefs that a commu-
nity holds about itself, serve as unifying mechanisms. 
Consolidating the group inwardly, mythical accounts of 
what unites “our” nation at the same time distinguish 
the “us” from outsiders – the Others. Myths are accounts 
5 25,671 people were erased from the register of Slovenia’s permanent residents in February 1992. For years the state representatives kept 
claiming that these people’s status had only been “transferred” from the records of Slovenia’s permanent residents (in times of Yugoslavia) 
to the register of “foreigners” (once Slovenia became independent). Although the Constitutional Court ruled that no constitutional basis 
existed for this state’s act, a number of people to this day still remain with their status unresolved. Though it is impossible to adequately 
discuss all the complex facets of the erasure within the scope of this article, the topic of the erased is immensely important for understand-
ing the Slovenian nationalism and particularly the state-building nationalising practices of post-1991 Slovenia. For more, see Dedić et 
al., 2003; Zorn, Lipovec Čebron, 2008; Kogovšek, Petković, 2010.
6 For example, special rights and privileges are granted to immigrants who are considered “ethnically” belonging to the Slovenian nation.
7 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991, emphasis added.
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of how something “began to be” (Eliade, 1964, 6) and 
because they are always about perceptions rather than 
historically validated truths, it is the content and not the 
accuracy of the myth that matters (Schöpflin, 1997, 19). 
Myths are regarded as dealing with realities because 
they are perceived as “true histories”, “sacred stories” 
(Eliade, 1964). Myths of nationhood often draw from ter-
ritorial attachment to a specific land, frequently related 
to a golden age, or particular events which supposedly 
happened in illo tempore. In Ukraine and Belarus, for 
instance, recent attempts to disentangle national myths 
of descent from traditional Russophile historiography 
(Wilson, 1997) have resembled similar strivings found 
in the territories of Yugoslavia’s successor states which 
try to disengage from sharing Slavic roots.
The symbolic return to the golden age is an impor-
tant part of nationalism because it mobilises the nation 
“to meet the challenges of nation-formation through a 
myth of national history and destiny” (Smith, 1997, 59). 
In this way, myths develop “a sense of togetherness” that 
enables people to “become the heirs of their ancestors” 
(Misāne, Priedīte, 1997, 160). Whether myths are con-
structed through supposed biological links of the present 
population with a common ancestor (myths of genea-
logical ancestry), or via a belief in the “cultural affinity 
and ideological ‘fit’ with presumed ancestors” (myths of 
ideological descent), both types are present in every na-
tional myth (Smith, 1999, 58).
The Slovenian nation is primarily identified by lan-
guage and searching for speakers of this particular ver-
nacular in the past as marking the Slovenian history has 
long remained unproblematised even by historiography. 
While any direct correspondence between early medi-
eval peoples and modern nations is a myth rather than 
accurate portrayal of the past, modern national states 
accentuate the continuity and identification of their core 
nation with the distant past, i.e. the Early Middle Ages, 
even Antiquity. The history of Europe thus escapes the 
confines of academic debate and becomes a constant 
site of contestation (cf. Geary, 2005). And it is precisely 
when analysing myths as boundary-making mechanisms 
which separate social groups that one can understand 
their potential for nation-building. Myth is thus “a key 
element in the creation of closures and in the constitu-
tion of collectivities” (Schöpflin, 1997, 20) and as such 
it is vital in turning chaos into cosmos (Eliade, 1957). 
CARANTHANIA AS THE MYTH OF SLOVENIAN 
ANTIQUITAS8
It is fascinating how precisely the nationalists are 
able to locate their ancestry, even though the historical 
“origins” of nations remain disputable. Any attempt to 
form a taxonomy of myths reveals how they can overlap 
and be contradictory at the same time. While “differ-
ent myths receive emphasis at different times to cope 
with different challenges”, one of the most commonly 
spread is the myth of territory (Schöpflin, 1997, 28). In 
the Slovenian case, the early medieval state Caranthania 
has been portrayed in nationalist myths, mass media, 
but also occasionally in official teachings of history (cf. 
Bajt, 2009) as that particular ancient territory where the 
nation expressed itself in its finest form. Recently as a 
part of the so-called Venetic theory, in such primordial 
accounts the Slovenians are argued to have inhabited 
their present-day homeland already in prehistoric times, 
while the Slovenian language was formed a long time 
ago, remaining almost unchanged until the present. 
Though historians have called on the need to surpass 
myths in Slovenian historiography (e.g. Štih, 1997, 2005, 
2006), conceptions of Slovenian history as commencing 
in the Early Middle Ages with the state of Caranthania 
remain the hallmark of amateur “historians” with a na-
tionalist agenda and which resonate in popular ideas of 
the “Slovenian” past.9
In the late 1980s, when the situation in Yugoslavia 
persistently failed to live up to its utopian promises of 
a better tomorrow, some Slovenians found it comfort-
ing to believe that their roots were not of Slavic but of 
Venetic origin. Distancing themselves from Slavs, from 
the other Yugoslavs, Slovenians were supposedly the de-
scendants of the Veneti, a prehistoric group that alleg-
edly survived the Celtic and Roman rule in the eastern 
Alpine region. The Venetic theory claims that the Veneti 
split into several subgroups, one of which was to form 
the “forerunners” of the Slovenians.10 Reading Jožko 
Šavli, an economist and a prominent proponent of the 
Venetic idea, some believe that his account offers con-
vincing argumentation and “impressive linguistic and 
topographical evidence” (Požun, 2000, 10). Historians, 
however, argue that the Venetic theory’s material evi-
dence is far from sufficient to decipher ethnic affiliations 
to a certain culture (e.g. Vidic, 1999) and highlight that 
8 I here adopt Kolstø’s (2005) typology of myths as boundary-making mechanisms, focusing on one of the three types: myths of being sui 
generis, myths of being antemurale, and myths of antiquitas.
9 See, for example, Felicijan (1967) who writes about “Slovenians” as early as 568, Požun (2000) who adopts the Venetic idea, and Gow 
and Carmichael (2000, 12) who recognise “Slovene customs, including the ritual of investiture by peasant voting” in the seventh century 
Caranthania.
10 The argument that the Slovenians are of Venetic origin was first made public in 1985 in the form of a news article written by Jožko Šavli 
and published in Vienna (Skrbiš, 2002). Matej Bor, a poet and a linguist, Ivan Tomažič, a Catholic priest based in Vienna, and Jožko 
Šavli, an economist, have been the main proponents of the Venetic theory. They joined forces in 1988 to publish a book on the subject. 
Originally published in German (Unsere Vorfahren die Veneter), its English version came out in 1996, entitled Veneti: First Builders of 
European Community. See also Šavli, 1990.
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the peoples of the Early Middle Ages “were not com-
munities of shared origin but poly-ethnic communities” 
(Luthar, 2008, 87).11 
In a comparative perspective, similar developments 
have been noted to accompany the collapse of Yugo-
slavia also in Croatia (e.g. Pavlaković, 2009), Serbia 
(e.g. Bieber, 2002; Pantelić, 2011), or Macedonia (e.g. 
Brunnbauer, 2005), to name just the most often studied 
examples. Moreover, ideas of the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina being direct descendants of the Bosnian 
nobility of the Middle Ages, arguments about the eight 
millennia of Serbian heritage, or recent inclusions of 
ancient Macedonians in the national narrative of Mac-
edonia (as well as its allusions to Alexander the Great 
– primarily to vex Greece) all reveal attempts at assist-
ing the nation’s survival. Regardless of their particular 
content, the national myths are those sacred stories of 
the nation that “establish, maintain or defend its iden-
tity” (Misāne, Priedīte, 1997, 158) and as such play a 
particularly potent role in times of social upheaval – as 
witnessed by the end of the Cold War and the break-up 
of multinational countries such as Yugoslavia, Czecho-
slovakia and the Soviet Union. Myths can be used in 
order to demonise the enemy at the same time as of-
fering stories of the in-group suffering that “deserves” 
retribution, as for instance the Kosovo myth (for more, 
see Bieber, 2002). Such myths of redemption and suffer-
ing should be understood as myths of powerlessness that 
claim a moral superiority for having suffered, demand-
ing compensation for that powerlessness and making a 
virtue of passivity and fatalism (Schöpflin, 1997). Put dif-
ferently, defeated nations “invent myths to explain their 
misfortune and to assist their survival” (Davies, 1997, 
141). In essence, the role of national myths is therefore 
to present history (of a given nation) “as a morality play 
of national resistance and revival against the main na-
tional ‘Other’” (Wilson, 1997, 183).
It is not uncommon that such myths of unjust treat-
ment exist side by side with more self-legitimising myths 
of ethnogenesis and antiquity, as well as myths of kin-
ship and shared descent (Schöpflin, 1997). Myths – and 
their interpretations – change, particularly because they 
are frequently used by political elites to re-create public 
memories, change values, support selected political pro-
jects. The key issue of interest here is how different his-
torical, archaeological or linguistic argumentation can 
be used to fit the specific needs of nationalist discourses, 
depending also on the broader political and social cli-
mate. Clearly, if being of Venetic origin, the Slovenians 
were separated from the other “Balkan” Slavs, a term 
not popular mostly due to its “imprecise and pejorative 
designation” (Pavlowitch, 1999, 331). It is not surprising 
that the Venetic theory was popularised in the late 1980s 
when the Slovenian nationalist elite started to feel a need 
for disassociation from Yugoslavia. Similarly, a book ti-
tled “Serbians, the Oldest Nation” (Luković-Pjanović, 
1990) – a linguistic attempt at proving the pre-ancient 
Indian origins of the Serbian nation – was published in 
Belgrade in 1990.12 A brief excursus into the field of so-
cial psychology explains the need of every individual 
and every social group to establish a positive identity. In 
the constant search for self-esteem, sometimes situations 
occur which hinder positive self-categorisation. People 
then tend to react in different ways, one of them being to 
select a different in-group of association and identifica-
tion.13 In the case of some Slovenians, switching from be-
ing Slavs – a stigmatised and often pejorative designation 
– to a new identity of being of a more “cultured” Venetic 
descent, made them believe that their dissatisfactions 
with other (Yugo)Slavs were in fact firmly grounded in 
their ancient “Latin” traditions, consequently justifying 
and giving sense to their presumed “natural” difference. 
In this way, theories on the absolute autochthonousness 
of Slovenians have always been an indicator of crisis, 
emerging especially in the 16th, 19th and 20th centuries, 
and accompanying watershed political events (the Refor-
mation and Counter-Reformation of the 16th century, the 
“spring of the nations” of 1848, and dissatisfaction with 
Yugoslavia in the 20th century).14 
As hypotheses placing the “beginnings” of the nation 
far back into the prehistoric period, “autochthonous” 
theories that map a particular people as occupying the 
same historical place through time thus also construct 
national myths of possessing a historical right to a given 
territory. The importance of such “invented traditions” 
makes the Slovenians no exception in their attempts to 
establish continuity with the past. Theories propagating 
“Slovenian European indigeneity” (Skrbiš, 2008, 142) 
have included ideas of Scandinavian and Etruscan ori-
gins of Slovenians and were particularly useful as a tool 
of national emancipation for the 19th century Romantic 
nationalists (Štih, 1997). This striving for continuity re-
11 The discussion about the Slovenian ethnogenesis is ongoing, yet with a very moderate public response, only occasionally re-emerging in 
the media. As an example of more prominent nation-wide media coverage, in October 2003 the national television hosted a late-night 
debate among invited linguistic and archaeological experts and proponents of the Venetic theory (a theologian and a chemist) titled 
“Veneti – our Ancestors?” (RTV Slovenija, Prvi program, Polnočni klub: Veneti – naši predniki?, 3. 10. 2003). On the Internet, however, 
the presence of these debates is much more pervasive and several websites include substantive sections devoted to such discussions.
12 It is significant that the first edition was published in the USA, revealing a wider trend of emigrant communities’ ardent support for na-
tionalist ideas that were thwarted by the communist Yugoslav authorities. The various debates on the Slovenian ethnogenesis have also 
generally encountered a more welcoming approach abroad (e.g. Austria, USA).
13 The cognitive wing of social psychology, notably Tajfel (1993) and Turner (1985), offer explanations of inter-group behaviour and explain 
why and how people form their social identities. For more, see for instance Augoustinos et al. (1996) and Abrams and Hogg (1990).
14 Similarly, popular media in Croatia have recently reported on a “sensational” discovery that the Bosnian Croats are not Slavs but old 
Balkanites. The contributions highlighted that a “scientific team” has discovered “the true origin of Croatians” (e.g. Kuljiš, 2011).
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flects one of the most important elements of every suc-
cessful nationalism: its primary belief in the distinctive-
ness of “its” nation. Whether the emphasis is on shared 
ancestry, ancient homeland or a more modern political 
view of a civic community, a bond needs to be shared. 
In the case of the Slovenians, this bond is the language. 
Much less prominent have been evocations of a golden 
age and collective memories of an ancient homeland. 
Still, the claims of a direct historical bond with the state 
of Caranthania cannot be overlooked, since they echo 
a wider nationalist revisionist desire. It is crucial not to 
dismiss such tendencies simply because their appeal has 
so far remained limited.
The Venetic argumentation hence reflects revisionist 
attempts of an expanding number of people to super-
sede the historical association of Slovenians with passiv-
ity and serfdom, which stems from the nation’s stateless 
existence, small numbers, and is also heavily reflected 
in Slovenian cultural production (e.g. folksongs, poems, 
novels that are filled with lyrical yearning for freedom 
or expressions of depression and resignation). At pains 
to show how Caranthania was in fact the first Sloveni-
an state and claiming that Veneti (or rather Sloveneti) 
– not Slavs! – were the indigenous inhabitants of the 
current Slovenian territory and direct ancestors of con-
temporary Slovenians, these ideas evolved in opposition 
to Yugoslav historiography of South Slavic shared ori-
gin and their melting together in the “brotherhood and 
unity” of the Yugoslav community.15 The Venetic theory 
challenged this and even though the general consensus 
remains that Slovenians are Slavs, the seed of doubt 
appears to be welcomed in allowing a belief in the pri-
mordial aspects of the Slovenian nation.
Moreover, masked in the “patriotic” rhetoric, my-
thologised takes on the past have also entered public 
collective memory. Ceremonial re-enactments of “Slo-
venian history” in annual public rituals celebrating 
the state’s independence frequently use the widely ac-
cepted and generally non-problematic literature-related 
symbolism of the national past, and in official historical 
depictions the myth of Slovenian ethnogenesis remains 
downplayed.16 Nevertheless, at least on two occasions 
the idea of Slovenian antiquitas has entered the public 
collective memory: in the national coat of arms and in 
the currency. National states perpetuate selected public 
memory through official history taught in schools, pub-
lic places, national holidays and symbols such as the 
flag and the anthem, being helped by historical novels, 
films, and the rhetoric of political leaders. With their ba-
nal presence in people’s lives, numerous daily remind-
ers of nationhood (cf. Billig, 1995) contribute to the spe-
cific nationalised Slovenian history.17 For example, the 
coat of arms includes a representation of Triglav Moun-
tain, and symbolises the Adriatic Sea and Slovenian riv-
ers. Its third element, however, the three golden Celeia 
stars, has been adopted from the supposedly Slovenian 
medieval counts of Celje. This appropriation obviously 
draws a link between the modern state of Slovenia and 
medieval nobility. As an even more blatant example of 
mythologising the national past, the selection of the du-
cal stone motif for the national side of the Slovenian 
euro coin caused quite a stir.18 Meant to indicate the 
country of issue, the euro coins tend to depict portraits 
of monarchs or various national monuments and sym-
bols. As such, the decision to select the princely stone 
for the national side of the 2 cent Euro coin was to re-
flect “the ancient symbol of the hierarchical organiza-
tion of power in the Slovenian consciousness”.19 Yet, the 
ducal stone is located in Austria, who also stakes a claim 
to its role in the Austrian national identity.20
Claiming that Caranthania was the first Slovenian 
state is a way of building a territorial myth of an an-
cient homeland. It is also a myth of ethnogenesis and 
antiquity that separates the Slovenians from the other 
Slavs by way of arguing they are the direct ancestors 
of an ancient autochtonomous population that survived 
all subsequent migrational flows and population mix-
ing. This, moreover, makes Caranthania a myth of kin-
ship and shared descent that constructs an idea of the 
organic nature of ethnic groups (Schöpflin, 1997). Such 
myths see the nation as a family, excluding all ethnic 
foreigners from the community of “us”. Finally, it is the 
supposed democratic nature of Caranthania’s political 
traditions that convinces certain Slovenians of the elec-
tion of the Slovenian people, legitimating their moral 
and cultural superiority. The potential for dangerous 
exclusionary practices based on such national myths is 
self-evident particularly considering that such historical 
myth-making gives credence to claims for control over 
specific territories. And myth-makers will, of course, 
tend to focus on the period of the state’s greatest expan-
sion, the so-called golden age (Kolstø, 2005).
15 The Venetic theory’s principal aim is to undermine the prevailing migration theory, which claims that Slovenians are the descendants of 
Slavs who migrated around the sixth century.
16 However, see Simonič (2009) for more on how Caranthania is evoked also in official public ceremonies.
17 For more on this point, see Bajt, 2009.
18 The ducal, also known as princely stone bears a particular symbolic value for Carinthian Slovenians in Austria. The stone played a cen-
tral part in investiture ceremonies of the dukes of Caranthania, and later Frankish counts, as well as princes of Carinthia. Traditionally, a 
peasant would first sit on the duke’s stone and thus lead the ceremony in the local language, ceremoniously transferring the power to the 
duke (cf. note 21 below).
19 See http://www.evro.si/o-evru/slovenski-kovanci/ for the full official explanation.
20 The ducal stone has been moved around Austria several times, particularly in 2005 following the proclamation of Slovenia’s intent to use 
it as its national symbol on Euro coins.
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The Slovenians trace their descent through the per-
sistence of their “distinctive cultural” quality, notably 
their language. At the same time, a biological link with 
the past is established when the community is seen as 
descending from a noble and heroic ancestor, like the 
Venetic theory of ethnogenesis attempts to prove. Caran-
thania and its symbols represent the Slovenian need for 
historical continuity. As a nation which did not form an 
independent state until the late 20th century, having its 
own customs and institutions embedded deep in his-
tory strengthens the idea of its uniqueness, its territorial 
claims and its inner solidarity. Caranthania provides a 
source of Slovenian cultural closeness to assumed an-
cestors and the rich symbolism of this long vanished 
state’s public rituals still attracts attention today.21 
The most avid proponents of the Venetic theory and 
retrospective nationalist beliefs in primordial origins of 
the Slovenian nation are self-proclaimed “patriotic” as-
sociations and movements that have sprung up across 
Slovenia particularly in recent years. Promoting un-
mistakably exclusionary and discriminatory policies, 
these groups draw their membership particularly from 
adolescent boys and young men. Even though they 
may profess differing values and aims, which span from 
open racism to more “subdued” chauvinist nationalism, 
groups such as Blood & Honour, Slovenski radikali (the 
Slovenian Radicals), Hervardi, Tukaj je Slovenija (This is 
Slovenia) and Stranka slovenskega naroda (The Party of 
the Slovenian Nation) are nonetheless examples of how 
patriotism is used to legitimise intolerant xenophobic 
and racist rhetoric. Moreover, all have eagerly adopted 
purportedly “ancient Slovenian” insignia, most notably 
the black panther of Caranthania.
Although these groups remain relatively limited in 
size and socio-political impact, it is significant that they 
draw noted public interest and enjoy the support of fringe 
politicians, but also a nod of approval of some main-
stream political parties. Spurred by intolerant nationalist 
individuals who attempt to use populist rhetoric in order 
to (re)gain public support, it is particularly worrisome 
that intolerant, xenophobic and racist rhetoric has been 
moved from the obscurity of extremist organisations to a 
problematic accompaniment of certain political actors. 
While they are at pains to show their avid patriotism, 
their exclusionary attitudes towards multiethnic, multi-
confessional and multicultural co-existence are clearly 
chauvinist, with frequent racist undertones.
CONCLUSION
Political ideology and theories of nationalism, partic-
ularly the so-called modernist stream of thought, antici-
pated the demise of nationalist forms. Political realities, 
however, indicate that national identities remain. Loyal-
ties that can broadly be described as “ethnic” continue to 
hold their importance, while also becoming important in 
new ways (Fenton, 1999). Arguing against the reification 
of nations or “ethnic communities” and being acutely 
aware of the danger to naturalise differences as stemming 
from time immemorial, this article contends that social 
meanings attributed to national differences are nonethe-
less sociologically significant. Moreover, relying on selec-
tive appropriations of history, the power of nationalisms 
lies in constructing myths, traditions, symbols, and im-
ages as exclusively national traits that then foster claims 
of national uniqueness. Hence, the nation is claimed to 
possess a common way of life, a uniting culture and na-
tional history that provides a link both to the past and the 
future, allowing a belief in shared national destiny.
This article avers that both top-down and bottom-up 
activities of so-called national elites work on construct-
ing and elevating one selected national culture and his-
tory, taking allegedly uniting ethno-cultural traits as a 
starting point for creating nation-ness that is supposedly 
unique and separate. As exemplified here by the dis-
cussion of the question of Slovenian ethnogenesis, the 
role of “national agitators” or cultural “revivalists” in 
the emergence of the Slovenian national identity has not 
stopped but remains an ongoing attempt of nationalist 
historic revisions. The importance of historical continu-
ity for the idea of the nation is invaluable and recent 
attempts to adopt Caranthania and its symbols as “Slo-
venian” reflect the need for historical permanence. A 
nation without an independent state until the late 20th 
century, the idea of having a direct link to ancient cus-
toms and institutions strengthens the supposed Slove-
nian uniqueness and the nation’s inner solidarity, but 
also legitimises territorial claims. Caranthania provides 
a source of Slovenian cultural closeness to the assumed 
ancestors and aids the revisionists’ desire to supersede 
the historical association of Slovenians with passivity 
and serfdom. Most significantly, it is a sharp break with 
the Yugoslav past.
Despite the reality of the world being a collage of 
multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic co-exist-
ence, this article argues that national states remain se-
cluded in ideals of monocultural national identities, 
constructing national myths and histories in order to 
demarcate separate symbolic national memberships. 
Situated within the sociology of nationalism and ana-
lysing a particular Slovenian example, the article main-
tains that national myths play a pivotal role in creating 
difference and promoting national uniqueness. Due to 
the historical absence of autonomous civic institutions, 
21 Some (e.g. Felicijan, 1976; Požun, 2000) even believe that Thomas Jefferson used the ancient custom of the installation of the dukes of 
Caranthania as his inspiration for the American Declaration of Independence. Namely, Caranthania’s ritualised investiture ceremony of 
enthroning the duke was rich in the symbolism of social contract. The duke symbolically changed into peasant clothes and accepted his 
power from a peasant, thereby indicating that the very people he was subsequently to govern awarded him the power.
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the Slovenians relied on their presumed descent ties and 
language as key factors in mobilising a distinct cultural 
identity. Moreover, this supposedly distinct identity has 
to be reproduced in order to form a particular tradition 
of Slovenian-ness, yet, as noted here, it frequently links 
with populist simplifications and mythicised claims to a 
glorious national past. Such claims, particularly when 
employed by self-proclaimed “patriotic” groups which 
factually promote cleavages and chasms along the con-
structs of ethnicity, nation, culture, race, gender, sexu-
ality, and so on, become the problematic emblems of 
mono-vocal discourses of exclusion and discrimination.
NACIONALNI MITI: SLOVENCI, KARANTANIJA IN VENETSKA TEORIJA
Veronika BAJT
Mirovni inštitut – Inštitut za sodobne družbene in politične študije, Metelkova 6, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija
e-mail: veronika.bajt@mirovni-institut.si
POVZETEK
Izhajajoč iz refleksije o konceptih multikulturalizma, transkulturnosti in nacionalne identitete v okviru študij na-
cionalizma, članek umešča izbrano študijo primera (Slovenija) znotraj širših znanstvenih razprav o vzpostavljanju 
in konstrukciji nacionalnih identitet. Hkrati je raziskovanje nacionalne identitete neločljivo povezano s sodobnimi 
globalizacijskimi procesi in vplivi (npr. nadnacionalnih povezav in tokov) kot tudi s sočasnimi silnicami lokalizacije, 
individualizacije in splošnega preseganja nacionalnega. Kljub dejstvu, da svet sestavljajo kompleksne mreže transna-
cionalnih umeščenosti in da realnost ne odraža nacionalnih držav, ki bi pomenile osamljene otoke enokulturne in 
monoetnične zamejenosti, se dejanske prakse večkulturnega sobivanja le redko zrcalijo v nacionalnih politikah, ki 
vztrajajo pri idealih izključevalnih, monokulturnih oziroma etnokulturno definiranih nacionalnih identitet. Prispevek 
kritično preprašuje zgodovinske in sodobne silnice izoblikovanja in ohranjanja slovenske nacionalne identitete, s 
posebnim poudarkom na konstrukciji nacionalnih mitov kot tistih elementov, ki legitimirajo obstoj in edinstvenost 
naroda, in s postavitvijo »narodnih korenin« globoko v preteklost ustvarjajo nacionalistične podlage za argumenti-
ranje vsakršnih sodobnih zahtev »v imenu naroda«. Članek se osredotoča na vlogo nacionalnih elit v vzpostavljanju 
nacionalne identitete in prepoznava njihovo tradicionalno zgodovinsko »narodnobuditeljsko« vlogo tudi v sodob-
nem času, kjer prevzemajo funkcijo definiranja in legitimacije »nacionalnih interesov«. Ustvarjanje kohezivnosti 
navznoter (homogenizacija naroda) in razločevanje od Drugih sta predstavljena kot dve pomembni posledici nacio-
nalnih mitov, katerih vloga zato ostaja pomembna, saj vedno znova poenostavljajo kompleksnost sveta in umeščajo 
skupnost ter jo definirajo kot edinstveno. 
Ključne besede: nacionalizem, nacionalna identiteta, nacionalne elite, nacionalni miti, etnogeneza, Slovenija, 
Karantanija, venetska teorija
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IZVLEČEK
V članku se soočamo s problematiko družbenega in političnega prepoznavanja socialne kategorije mešanih ljudi. 
S tem namenom uvajamo izraz kultura mešanosti. Kultura mešanosti vključuje ideje politik rasne mešanosti in gibanja 
za rasno mešanost (izvirajočega iz anglosaksonskega kulturnega konteksta), vendar jih hkrati presega z vključitvijo 
teorije Welshovega transkulturalizma. Kultura mešanosti je težnja po vzpostavitvi akademskega, političnega in obče 
družbenega prostora, dovzetnega za prepoznanje mešanih ljudi, in vključuje hibridne kulturne identitete migrantov prve, 
druge in tretje generacije, otrok etnično mešanih družin in vseh nas – realnih ali imaginarnih popotnikov po fi zičnih, 
simbolnih in virtualnih prostorih globalizirajočega se postmodernega sveta. V podporo tezi kulture mešanosti so med 
drugim predstavljeni tudi rezultati empirične raziskave, izvedene v letu 2010 na štirih slovenskih obmejnih območjih 
(slovensko-hrvaškem, slovensko-madžarskem, slovensko-avstrijskem in slovensko-italijanskem), ki dokazujejo dejansko 
transkulturno naravnanost prebivalcev obmejnih teritorijev. 
Ključne besede: kulturni pluralizem, transkulturnost, politika kulturne mešanosti, pluralne identitete, hibridne identi-
tete, politika rasne mešanosti, kultura mešanosti
LA CULTURA METICCIA. RICONOSCIMENTO SOCIALE E POLITICO 
DELLA CATEGORIA SOCIALE DI PERSONE MISTE
SINTESI
In quest’articolo ci troviamo di fronte alla problematica del riconoscimento sociale e politico della categoria sociale di 
persone miste. A tale scopo introduciamo l’espressione cultura meticcia. La cultura meticcia include le idee delle politiche 
di mescolanza razziale e del movimento per la mescolanza razziale (derivato dal contesto culturale anglosassone), ma, 
contemporaneamente, le supera, grazie all’inserimento della teoria del transculturalismo di Welsh. La cultura meticcia è 
un’aspirazione a stabilire uno spazio accademico, politico e sociale generale, per il riconoscimento di persone miste e 
comprende identità culturali ibride dei migranti della prima, seconda e terza generazione, fi gli di famiglie etnicamente 
miste, e tutti noi - viaggiatori reali o immaginari attraverso spazi fi sici, simbolici e virtuali di un mondo globalizzato 
e postmoderno. A sostegno della tesi di cultura meticcia sono tra gli altri presentati i risultati di una ricerca empirica 
condotta nel 2010 in quattro aree di confi ne slovene (sloveno-croata, sloveno-ungherese, sloveno-austriaca e sloveno-
italiana), che dimostrano l’effettiva posizione transculturale dei residenti frontalieri di questi territori.
Parole chiave: pluralismo culturale, transculturalità, politica della mescolanza culturale, identità plurali, identità 
ibride, politica della mescolanza razziale, cultura meticcia
